The reports of “vote flipping” on voting machines in PA are certainly alarming to the voters using the machines, but it’s unfortunate that there are calls to treat it as a law enforcement issue. It’s a known issue with the decade-or-older flakey touch screens, and one that local election officials deal with in most elections. In some cases it may be user error; in others, a result of poor screen calibration. Sometimes the appearances are even more problematic, as with a mis-recorded straight-party vote, which affects every contest on the ballot.

Though voters and poll workers may disagree on what actually happened in these cases, what’s not controversial is the small scale — about 24 out of 24,000 machines statewide; only one voter affected per machine; and in at least some of these cases, the voter admitted that after some work, they got their votes recorded properly.

So concerns about “rigging” of individual machines is misplaced. Even leaving aside the technical fact that these are electro-mechanical issues — not riggable software — it’s a poor choice for rigging to choose a method that’s apparent to the voters, and in such small numbers.

But suppose that the resolution of the PA election depends in-part on refuting claims of rigging? That these machines have real problems. With no paper trail, there is no way to re-check the voters’ choices. A recount is, in one sense, an exercise in re-doing or rerunning the addition of the vote tallies from each machine. But it’s more complicated than that.

In each county with these paperless touch-screen machines, for each machine, the election officials have to maintain records of custody of the machines and their removable data cartridges, with record-keeping procedures sufficient to withstand substantial challenges. It’s not impossible to refute claims of rigging in these circumstances, but it is grindingly detailed work, and with a lot of grist for the mill of legal challenges.

— John Sebes